THE ULTIMATE BELIEF

A. CLUTTON-BROCK

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THE ULTIMATE BELIEF

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STUDIES IN CHRISTIANITY

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THE ULTIMATE BELIEF

By A. CLUTTON-BROCK
Author of
"Studies in Christianity"

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PREFACE

When I began this little book I meant it for teachers. My object was to state very simply certain beliefs about the nature of man and of the universe, which, as it seems to me, children ought to be taught, so that their minds may be protected against sophistries old and new. But, as I wrote, I found that I was trying to make these beliefs more clear to myself. The task was more difficult than I had expected, and I could not write a simple text-book about matters still in dispute and about an issue that takes a new form in every generation.

So I cannot call the book a text-book. It is controversial, and on one important point it attacks our whole English system of education. Still, I hope that it may be of use to

teachers, though little of it could be taught directly to children. But there are things which we need to teach ourselves in one form before we can teach them to our children in another; and this war, among other things, has convinced me that we in England need to teach ourselves first, and then our children, a true and coherent philosophy, if we are to withstand that false and coherent philosophy which now possesses the mind of Germany and to which she owes her fanatical power. Such a philosophy I have tried to state as shortly and clearly as I could in this book. It is not addressed to philosophers, but to everyone who believes that it is important to think rightly about first principles; and surely the present war proves that it is important.

A. CLUTTON-BROCK.

FARNCOMBE, SURREY.
March 2nd, 1916.

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INTRODUCTION

ALTHOUGH this little book might have been written at any time, yet I was provoked to write it by the present war. The Germans teach in their schools a certain body of doctrine, which the great mass of them accept, and upon which they are now acting. It has given them unity and a great and fanatical strength; but it has also led them into the crimes that we know of. We, on the other hand, are taught no body of doctrine in our schools, at least none that can be called philosophical, and we are rather proud of the fact. If philosophy leads the Germans into such wickedness, we are better without it, we think. But the German doctrine has produced its evil effects because it is bad philosophy, bad intellectually no less than

morally; and the fact that some thinking is bad is not a reason why we should not think at all. The Germans have been encouraged by their bad thinking to exercise certain virtues perversely and to bad ends, but still to exercise them in a manner which has astonished the world; while we have been little encouraged by thinking, good or bad, to exercise any virtues. We have our education, but it is not based upon any philosophical principles, upon any theory of the nature of man or of the universe. We have our religion also; but that, again, has little philosophy in it; and a religion without philosophy is a religion without consciousness. It may preserve its dogmas, but it does not know what those dogmas mean. A boy, for instance, is told that there is a God and that he ought to love God; but behind that is the philosophical question: Why ought he to love God? And unless that is rightly answered, he will try to love God for the wrong reason, and will not succeed in loving Him at all. He may deceive himself and believe that he is loving God when he is only loving himself.

That is what happens to people who think that they must love God so that they may go to Heaven. For it is self-interest that makes them wish to go to Heaven; and you cannot love God, or anyone or anything else, from self-interest.

Philosophy alone can teach you why you should love God or anyone else, and what is the nature of love; and therefore we cannot do without philosophy, however religious we may be. Indeed, the more religious we are, the more we see the need of philosophy, and the need of teaching it to the young from the very first. We cannot be good, we cannot teach others how to be good, unless we have clear ideas about the nature of goodness and the reasons why men should be good. To tell a child that he should do this or that, without making any attempt to tell him why, is to teach him that life is a game with arbitrary rules; and if it is that, it is not worth living.

On that point the Germans have at least taught a clear doctrine. They have taught their children that they must be good, that

they must do everything, for the good of Germany; and their children have believed this and have been astonishingly good according to the German notion of goodness. They have been industrious, obedient, and self-sacrificing. They have made their country the tidiest, the most efficient, the most powerful in the world, and an intolerable nuisance to all mankind. Clearly, then, their notion of goodness is not our notion; but we need to know what our notion is if we are to keep our minds free from the contagion of theirs. And we have made little effort to know what our notion is or to teach it to our children. We cannot teach it to them unless we know what it is, unless we know what we believe about the mind of man, about the purpose of his life, and about the nature of the universe. Without this knowledge our teaching must be dull and incoherent and unconvincing, and our children will rebel against it, as, indeed, they often do. There is in England a great deal of blind rebellion and wasteful reaction among the young. We are rather proud of that; but we have no reason to be.

If we taught them what is true, it would be well for them to learn it and believe it. If we have not taught them what is true, we had better not have taught them at all. Rebellion always means error, either in the rebel or in that against which he rebels; and it is therefore at best a *pis aller*. The test of good teaching is that it shall be believed and shall benefit those who believe it. German teaching is good in that it is believed, but bad in that it does not benefit those who believe it. Our teaching is bad in that it commonly appears incredible to the more intelligent of the young; and it appears incredible to them because there is no coherence or consistency in it.

I am not myself a teacher; but I have been taught myself, and I remember my own blind reactions against what I was taught. Looking back at them, it seems to me that I rebelled because I was never told, no effort was made to tell me, why I should love knowledge or beauty or righteousness. I was merely told that I must learn my lessons and obey certain rules of conduct, and I concluded that I must

do so for the convenience of my teachers and because they would make it unpleasant for me if I did not. This, no doubt, was partly my fault. I might have seen the connection between their teaching and my own spiritual desires; but they also might have made this connection plain to me. As it was, I had to discover for myself, slowly, clumsily, and painfully, what I now believe about the mind of man, about the purpose of his life, and about the nature of the universe.

In this book I have tried to state these beliefs shortly and clearly. I do not pretend that they are original; I hope rather that they are what most men believe and what most teachers would wish to teach. Only they are so seldom stated or taught that few, I think, can be fully conscious of them. The war and the crimes of the German people have made me wish to be fully conscious of my beliefs, and I have noticed the same wish in many others, young and old. We all know that there is a philosophy behind the German conduct, a false philosophy which they have been taught for national ends. What philo-

sophy are we to believe and to teach, so that we may not fall into their error, and so that we may escape from the errors and weaknesses peculiar to ourselves? We in England, for the last generation and more, have been neither learners nor teachers to much effect. This evil has come upon the world without our having much share in it or against it. We have hid our talent in a napkin, and neither led nor misled mankind. Now we see that we cannot remain in this negative state. We must believe either what the Germans believe or something positively and splendidly contrary to it. We must have a philosophy of our own and one that we can teach to our children.

Such a philosophy I have tried to state, not as it can be taught to children, but as it can be clearly understood by teachers, who will know, better than I can, how to teach it. If they believe it, and act upon it, it must affect their method of teaching as well as what they teach; but method is a matter for them, not for me who have no experience in teaching.

Those who know the Æsthetic of Benedetto Croce will see that I have learnt much from him about æsthetics. They will also see, perhaps, that at one point I depart from his teaching. But of this I am not quite sure myself. It may be that I am only drawing conclusions that he would draw. In any case, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to him.

I

THE NEED OF PHILOSOPHY FOR ALL

Most people in England think of a philosopher as one who talks in a difficult language about matters which are of interest only to philosophers. But Philosophy is concerned with what must interest every human being, with the nature of man and the nature of the universe. Every man is born a philosopher, but often the philosopher is suppressed in him by the hand-to-mouth thinking needed for the struggle for life. So boys are often more philosophical than men, pupils than their teachers; and what they miss in their lessons, without knowing it, is philosophy. It is the lack of philosophy which makes

education uninteresting to them and which causes them to rebel against it. They want to know why they should be good, why they should love knowledge; and no one tells them why. They may not actually ask philosophical questions either of their teachers or of themselves; but there is a philosophical curiosity unsatisfied in their minds which causes them to be unsatisfied with all that they are taught. Just as they learn Latin grammar without knowing why, so they learn conduct without knowing why; and always they want to know why. They seek a reason why they should do what they are told to do, and it is not given to them.

If you ask the teacher why he does not give a reason, he will answer, perhaps, either that there is no need to give a reason, since every human being knows that he ought to do what is right, or else that it would be impossible to make boys or girls understand philosophy. But both of these answers really mean the same thing, namely, that he himself has lost his natural interest in philosophy and

with it his power of teaching philosophy. He cannot teach philosophy if he has none; he cannot make that plain to others which is not plain to himself; and he is naturally tempted to think that there is no need to teach that which he cannot teach.

But the example of Germany proves that there is a need to teach philosophy. The German boy is given a reason why he should be good and why he should love knowledge. He is told that he must do everything to increase the glory and power of Germany. That is bad philosophy, but it is philosophy. It gives him the wrong reason, but it does give him a reason; and the consequence is that he does learn far more willingly and thoroughly than the English boy learns. The world is to him intelligible, even if he understands it wrongly, whereas to the English boy it is unintelligible. The German philosophy has had such evil results that there is a danger lest we should be confirmed in our neglect of all philosophy. But the remedy for bad philosophy is not no philosophy at

all, but good philosophy. Men and boys are of such a nature that they need reasons for doing whatever they are told to do; and if they fail to find the right reasons they find the wrong ones.

We think that we can go through life without any philosophy at all; but there we are in error. By the very process of living and acting we come to hold certain beliefs about our own nature and the nature of the universe, although we may never state these beliefs to ourselves. Thus, if a man's main object in life is to get money, he will come to believe that nothing is so well worth having as money, and all his other beliefs will become consistent with that belief. We are generally agreed that a man's main object should not be to get money; but how many of our teachers could explain clearly and convincingly to their pupils what object he should have in life and why? The German teacher would tell his pupils that their main object in life should be to make Germany strong, and he seems able to convince his pupils of

that. The Germans despise our education because our teachers seem unable to convince their pupils of anything; and they have some reason for their contempt. We may not teach a false philosophy as they do, but we teach no philosophy at all; and the consequence is that many of us acquire a false philosophy without knowing it. If the great evil in Germany is the conscious worship of Germany, the great evil in England is the unconscious worship of money, and against that our boys and girls have no philosophical protection whatever.

They have, it may be said, a religious protection; but religion itself is at the mercy of a false philosophy. Often the money-grubber believes himself to be a religious man; and his religion may be, theologically, much the same as the religion of St. Francis. Yet, because his philosophy is different, his idea of God and his reasons for obeying God will be different. Obedience to him will be, what it was not to St. Francis, a sound investment.

I was once present at a service for City clerks held by an American evangelist. He prayed that many of those present might, that day, lay the basis of a successful commercial career by finding Christ. He differed from St. Francis philosophically rather than theologically, and he had managed to make his religion quite consistent with his philosophy. If he did not think that Mammon could give men an introduction to God, he did think that God could give men an introduction to Mammon. The virtues to him were all paying virtues; and what paid in this world would pay in the next.

There is always a consistency between our ideas of this world and of another; and it is philosophy, not theology, which determines our ideas of both. Therefore we need philosophy as well as religion; or rather philosophy is a part of religion, and our religion cannot be right unless our philosophy is right, as that American evangelist proved. To teach a boy religion without philosophy is to teach him mere mythology which he can

do what he likes with. You tell him that there is a God and that he must obey the will of God; but, unless you tell him why, he may think that he must obey the will of God so that he may go to Heaven. It is philosophy which tells him why, and you must have a philosophy before you can tell him why.

But in the love of God is implied a love of other things, not himself, and philosophy tells him why he should love these also. Its effort, indeed, the great effort of philosophy for the last 2,000 years and more, is to explain why we should love things other than ourselves and what things we should love, and this effort has not been in vain. There is a philosophy which does explain this so that we can understand it, which appeals to our experience like any other science. For philosophy is science or it is nothing; it is, indeed, the one science which everybody needs and without which we are ignorant of essential knowledge.

And yet philosophy does not seem to have

established any truth as surely as some truths have been established by the natural sciences. No man is listened to who tells us that the earth is flat, but we do listen to those who tell us that we can really love nothing and value nothing but ourselves. The great effort of philosophy is still opposed by men called philosophers, and, what is more, the mass of men do not know what this effort has accomplished. To them philosophical questions are all open questions; and they believe that this is so because of the failure of philosophy to prove anything. But it is not philosophy that has failed; rather it is men who have failed to do that by which alone they can be convinced. Philosophy is a science, and its truths can only be confirmed by experiment. But, whereas to confirm a truth of botany it is necessary only to make experiments upon plants, to confirm a truth of philosophy we must make experiments upon ourselves. Thus, if philosophy tells us what we ought to value, we can only test the truth of it by valuing that

which it tells us to value. We must make an experiment in valuing; and we must make it in action as well as in thought or feeling. If, for instance, a man values money more than anything else, he will act in accordance with his values; his one object in life will be to get money. So, when philosophy tells him that there are other things more valuable than money, he must alter his whole way of living, if he is to test the truth of that philosophy by experiment; and this he will often refuse to do.

That is why certain truths of philosophy, though they may have been confirmed by experiment in the lives of all good and wise men, are not universally accepted. There is a philosophy which might say of itself: "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice." We know what answer Pilate made to these words. He asked: "What is truth?" and, as Bacon says, would not stay for an answer. If he had listened to

the answer and believed it, he would have been forced to alter his whole way of life. Rather than do that he believed that truth was not to be found. But truth remains truth, even though men ask what it is and will not stay for an answer; and to those who hear it and act upon it it proves itself to be truth.

II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRIT

THERE is a truth about the nature of man and the nature of the universe which philosophy has established with the thought of centuries, and which philosophy alone can state clearly. This truth can be taught to all and should be known by all. It can be taught gradually to children from their earliest years; and they will be convinced by it the more they are taught it and the more they act upon it. It makes education intelligible because it makes life intelligible; and it is welcomed by every unperverted mind because it answers to the desires of that mind, to the desires of what we call the spirit.

Spirit is a name given by philosophy to that part of us which has certain desires that are not desires of the flesh. Spirit is known by its desires, which are different from those of the flesh and can only be satisfied by different means. So there is a philosophy of the spirit which asserts the supremacy of the spirit and which has established the truth about the nature of man and the nature of the universe, a truth which every man can confirm for himself by his own experiments. The philosophy of the spirit tells us that the spirit desires three things and desires these for their own sake and not for any further aim beyond them. It desires to do what is right for the sake of doing what is right; to know the truth for the sake of knowing the truth; and it has a third desire which is not so easily stated, but which I will now call the desire for beauty without giving any further explanation of it (an attempt at an explanation will be found on pp. 65–88). These three desires, and these alone, are the desires of the spirit; and they differ from all our other desires in that they are to be pursued

for their own sake, and can, indeed, only be pursued for their own sake. If they are pursued for some ulterior end, they change their nature. If, for instance, I aim at goodness, so that I may profit by it, it is no longer goodness that I aim at, but profit. I may do what is right, but I do it for the sake of something else which I value more than doing what is right. I might do what is wrong for the sake of this something else, if it seemed to me that I could better achieve my purpose so. So if I try to discover the truth that I may profit by it, I am really aiming, not at the truth, but at my own profit. And my aim would lead me to believe what is untrue, if I thought that I should profit by that belief. In fact, the only way to discover truth is to seek it for its own sake, and the only way to do what is right is to do it for its own sake.

So the spirit has three activities, and three alone, as it has three desires; namely, the moral, the intellectual, and the æsthetic activities. And man lives so that he may exercise these three activities of the spirit, and for no other reason. Every other theory

of life, however it may be presented, amounts to this—that man lives so that he may live—and is incessantly contradicted by all the higher values and activities of man. It cannot be explained why these values and activities seem to man higher, if they are really subsidiary to the mere business of living. But the philosophy of the spirit says that the business of living is subsidiary to them, and that man can only satisfy himself in his life if he lives so that he may exercise the activities of the spirit and not so that he may go on living.

This is not a mere theological dogma pretending to be philosophy. It is the result of experience and it appeals to experience. It has been discovered by experiment that men can be good, can understand the nature of goodness, only if they aim at goodness for its own sake. There is in them a desire for goodness which can be satisfied only by the pursuit of goodness for its own sake. And so it is with truth. But experience also shows that the opposite is true of those activities which are not spiritual. They must

always be means and not ends, and means to our spiritual activities; and we only pursue them well or get what we want from them if we pursue them as means. Thus if we live for the sake of living, we do not live well and are not satisfied with our lives. To live for the sake of living will not teach us how to live. A man should take care of his health that he may the better exercise his spiritual activities. If he takes care of his health for the sake of his health, he will think so much about it that he will become unhealthy. So, too, he should eat that he may the better exercise his spiritual activities. If he eats for the sake of eating, he will eat too much, and so injure both his body and his mind and become incapable even of the pleasure of eating.

All this, perhaps, will seem commonplace to the reader. But I would ask him, especially if he is a teacher, to note the fact that there are three activities of the spirit; all of them, because they are activities of the spirit, to be exercised equally for their own sake. This is the fact which is commonly ignored

in our education and in our philosophy, so far as we have one; and because it is ignored our education fails to satisfy those who are taught, and our philosophy fails to satisfy ourselves. The common belief of most teachers and moralists in England is that there is only one activity of the spirit, the moral—that we must do good for the sake of doing good and for no other reason—but that the intellectual and æsthetic activities are subsidiary to the moral, and not really spiritual at all. It is implied, if not actually taught, in most of our education that truth is to be sought because it is useful, and that beauty is to be produced or experienced because it gives pleasure. The moralist, if he is really a moralist, rightly assumes both utility and pleasure to be subsidiary to righteousness; but he is wrong when he tests truth by its usefulness, or beauty by the pleasure which it gives. The intellectual activity often is useful, and so is the moral; but neither can be rightly exercised if utility is their aim. The æsthetic activity often does give pleasure, but so does the intel-

lectual; yet neither can be rightly exercised if pleasure is their aim. Not one of the three spiritual activities is itself, unless it is exercised for its own sake. And unless we understand this fact we cannot exercise the spiritual activities nor teach others to exercise them.

The great defect of English thought, which is a result of our lack of philosophy, is that we are always apt to think of everything in terms of something else, and to believe that we have explained it when we have thought of it in terms of something else. Thus, when we say that honesty is the best policy, we are thinking of it in terms of something else, commending it, not as honesty, but as expediency. But honesty is not expediency; it is a moral quality, simply itself, and to be desired for itself; and if you think of it as expediency, you cease to know what it is. So if you tell a boy that honesty is the best policy, you tell him what is often untrue. He finds out for himself soon enough that it is not always the best policy; and he may prefer policy to honesty, because he has never been taught what

honesty is, nor why he should prefer it to dishonesty. What he needs to be taught is that there is in him a spirit which desires honesty for its own sake and not for any other reason whatever. This is a fact about his own nature of which education should make him fully conscious, and which he can prove to himself by experiment. If he will try to be honest for the sake of honesty, he will find that the spirit in him is satisfied; but it never will be satisfied by any kind of morality pursued for any other reason. If he thinks of morality in terms of something else, it will cease to be morality to him, and his spirit will not be satisfied with it.

We know that it is immoral to think of morals in terms of something else, although we constantly tend to do so; but we shall never escape from that tendency until we recognise the other activities of the spirit, and understand that, because they are activities of the spirit, they cannot be subordinate even to each other. We must realise, and teach, that the value of truth is absolute no less than the value of goodness, and that

the value of beauty is as absolute as the value of the other two. This is not a mere theory to be argued about by philosophers. It is a plain fact of immediate importance to everyone, and therefore to be taught in all education. Unless I value truth for its own sake I cannot discover truth. Unless I value beauty for its own sake I cannot see or hear or in any way experience beauty. The moralist may wish that it should be otherwise; but he cannot alter the nature of the universe or the mind of man to suit his own purposes. It is part of his moral problem to face the facts of life, and if he teaches others that the facts are what they are not, he is behaving immorally for the sake of morals; which means that he is ceasing to understand the nature of morals.

It is a fact that, if I try to discover the truth for some moral end, I shall probably fail to discover it. My further aim will prevent me from seeing things as they are, and I shall see them as I wish to see them for moral purposes. So it is a fact that I cannot experience beauty for some moral end. The

further aim actually hinders the experience, and this is still more clear when we come to the production of beauty in works of art. If the artist tries to produce a work of art so that he may make others good, it is not a work of art that he produces. There is in all of us an intellectual and an æsthetic conscience, as well as a moral conscience; and if I want to be intellectually or æsthetically right, I must obey the intellectual or the æsthetic conscience, just as I must obey the moral conscience if I want to be morally right. All conscience is of the spirit and is to be obeyed because it is of the spirit, and without any ulterior aim. All the values of the spirit are absolute values; and unless we value absolutely all that the spirit tells us to value, we fail to value life or the universe itself. The universe is to be valued because there is truth in it and beauty in it; and we live to discover the truth and the beauty no less than to do what is right. Indeed, we cannot attain to that state of mind in which we shall naturally do what is right unless we are aware of the truth and the beauty of the

universe. The moral faculty only works rightly when it is enriched and directed by the other two faculties of the spirit, each exercised for its own sake.

Thus a man who does not believe in the absolute value of truth will fail in sincerity because of his disbelief. It is a fact that, if we are to be good, we must exercise our intellectual faculties to the best of our ability. It is true, of course, that a man may be good without having a great intellect by nature. It is the exercise of his intellect, rather than its original capacity, which affects his goodness. It is an instrument to be used, and used rightly, and if it is not rightly used, it will be wrongly used, and so injure his whole character. That is the moral of the parable about the talents. The man who hid his talent in a napkin refused to use his intellect rightly and was therefore condemned morally. But the intellect can only be used rightly in the pursuit of truth for its own sake. Truth is what the intellectual activity does naturally aim at. It is an appetite for truth, just as the moral activity is an appetite

for goodness; and if it is perverted from its proper aim, it is perverted altogether, and perverts the moral activity also.

Everyone does instinctively feel that there is some kinship between goodness, truth, and beauty. The philosophy which insists upon that kinship is not mere empty theorising; it is based upon the universal experience of mankind, and attempts to emphasise and explain a fact of that experience. We do feel always that there is something good in truth, something beautiful in goodness, something true in beauty. And the reason is that all three are the aim of spiritual activities, all three are desired for their own sake and not as means to something else. Directly we attempt to desire any of them as means to something else, we cease to desire them and cease to be aware of their true nature.

It is the failure to recognise this fact which spoils so much moral education and which causes the young to rebel against it. The young, in their inexperience, may not be aware of the great practical importance of the moral activity. But this very inexperience

makes them often more aware than their elders of the absolute value of the intellectual and æsthetic activities. They have not, of course, a conscious philosophic theory of their absolute value, but often they do passionately feel their absolute value; and when they are taught that the moral activity alone has an absolute value, they rebel against that teaching. And they are right; for those other activities of the spirit which they feel working in themselves have also, each, their own absolute value; and if they are denied and thwarted and starved, the spirit itself is starved with them. It is the spirit which rebels against the denial of the absolute value of all its faculties, and this rebellion is often mistaken both by the young themselves and by their elders for a rebellion against morals.

What is needed, therefore, is not merely a moral education, which by itself fails to satisfy the young, but an education of the spirit and of all three spiritual activities. The young should be told that they have all three spiritual faculties and that all three

must be exercised for their own sake. Spiritual education is an education in moral, intellectual, and æsthetic disinterestedness. It must insist upon the fact that the aim of life is to exercise each of these faculties for its own sake, and that a man who does not so exercise them is not living at all. It may also point out that in practice the moral faculty needs to be more constantly exercised than the other two, but it should point out also that the moral faculty cannot be properly exercised if the other two are starved, that we must answer to the call of each when we hear it, that we must obey our intellectual and our æsthetic consciences if we are also to obey our moral conscience.

In every human being there is the desire for the exercise of all three faculties. Education should make him fully conscious of that desire and should encourage him to value it, as a desire of the spirit, above all the desires of the flesh. And it should do this, not merely by a series of arbitrary commands, but by an explanation to him of his own spiritual nature, a philosophical explanation

expressed as plainly as possible, and appealing constantly to his own experience.

The young are often uncertain in their values through lack of experience, and therefore apt to be ashamed of what is best in them. A boy will be ashamed of his own desire for goodness, or beauty, or truth, of his own natural love of these things; and ridicule will easily induce him to hide or suppress it. This ridicule has the more power over him because he is uncertain of himself, because he does not know himself. He is fond of poetry, perhaps, and another boy tells him that poetry is "all rot." That opinion seems to him to be the opinion of the world, and he supposes that he has a private weakness for poetry, that the poets themselves are only oddities like him playing a poor sort of game in which sensible people can take no interest. And the worst of it is that his very teachers often seem to hold the same opinion. To them, also, poetry is not business, or it is only business when written in Latin or Greek, so that boys may learn those languages from it. So the boy

who loves poetry comes to think of himself as a peculiar person in a hostile and stupid world. He hides his love from the world as if it were a guilty secret; but at the same time he prides himself on it, and very likely becomes a prig. Or he discovers with surprise, when he knows the world better, that many people love poetry, many even of his own school-fellows. He is not a peculiar person at all; and if only he had known that as a boy, he would have been both happier himself and more agreeable to others. As he did not know it, the secrecy of his love for poetry made it morbid and fanatical, and it takes him years to throw off this morbidity, if he ever throws it off.

But it should be part of the schoolmaster's business, and of the parent's, to explain that the love of poetry is natural to the spirit and not peculiar to a few oddities; that a boy is neither foolish nor remarkable because he loves poetry, or because he loves truth, or because he loves goodness. The schoolmaster and the parent are apt to be afraid of extreme spiritual enthusiasm in the young.

They think it is unhealthy, and it often is unhealthy, because the enthusiast seems to himself a peculiar person with all the world against him. The cure for this unhealthiness is not an occasional silly joke at his enthusiasm, but to explain to him its nature and value and to make him see that it is not peculiar to himself. Nothing is more strange in our schools, and in our whole society, than the immense conspiracy, mostly unconscious, which is maintained to ignore the natural activities of the spirit. We have a kind of false shame, almost a kind of prudery, about them. If we talk about them at all it is with hushed voices, or with forced facetiousness, as if we were talking of something indecent. We ought to talk about them as about other plain matters of fact, and to assume that they are just as interesting to everyone as money-making. For that is the truth about them; they are plain matters of fact and universally interesting, much more interesting than the matters about which we do talk seriously.

This false shame, this prudery of ours, is the result of our ignorance of the philosophy

of the spirit. We never put it clearly to ourselves that the activities of the spirit are to be pursued for their own sake, and that in every man there is a spirit which desires to pursue them for their own sake. We think that these activities are not business; but that is just what they are, the proper business of all mankind, not of a few elect or idle. But, not understanding this, we think that we ourselves are elect or idle when we exercise these activities; and we teach our children to think the same. So there has grown up among us, at least among the well-to-do, a tiresome frivolity about these activities which is supposed to be a mark of education and which is really a mark of false shame. We have in particular a tiresome frivolity about morals, which is, no doubt, an unconscious reaction against the notion that the spirit is concerned with morals alone. We feel that a man who takes only morals seriously is over-serious; whereas, really, his seriousness is too narrow. We need to be completely serious about all the activities of the spirit, because they are to be pursued for their own sake, and about

nothing else. And true humour is a recognition of the fact that nothing else is completely serious compared with these activities. It is a criticism of misapplied seriousness, in ourselves or in others; and the glory of it is that it explodes all bugbear or sham seriousness with the sudden revelation of laughter. But there must be the real seriousness before the sham can be exploded; and so behind all real humour there is the philosophy of the spirit. But behind the sham humour which laughs at morals there is only a confused sense that morals are made too much of. And so it is with the sham humour that laughs at each of the other activities of the spirit. It is aware of an error, but it does not know what the error is, because behind it there is no philosophy of the spirit, no recognition of the equal seriousness of all three spiritual activities.

Naturally, since it is commonly supposed that the only spiritual activity is the moral, there are rebels to whom the only spiritual activity is the intellectual or the æsthetic. They point out the bad morals of those to whom

morals are everything; and in turn their own æsthetic or intellectual failings are pointed out. Just as fun is made of the moralist, so it is made of the pedant or the æsthete; and in each case with justice. You must recognise and exercise all three spiritual activities if you are to exercise any one of them quite naturally and rightly. The conscienceless artist of genius is a figment, and so is the philistine saint. A man cannot be an artist if he has no conscience, nor can he be a saint if he is a philistine. The artist must have an artistic conscience; and there is always some thing of the moral conscience in that—enough, at least, to make him see the beauty of holiness. So, too, there is always enough of the æsthetic conscience in the saint to see the holiness of beauty. In fact, each conscience is aware of its kinship with the other two, and each is itself a way to the other two.

But it ceases to be this if it is narrowly and unphilosophically exclusive; and also it ceases to be itself. The moralist, if he does not recognise the other two spiritual activi-

ties, inevitably comes to think of morals themselves as a means to comfort either in this world or the next, because he does not know what to do with his morals; the mere æsthete inevitably becomes a hedonist; the mere intellectualist a sophist or a pedant. Each is a failure of education, and it is only by means of a full and clear philosophy of the spirit that we can avoid such failures.

III

THE MORAL ACTIVITY

HAVING spoken of the three activities of the spirit in general, I shall now speak of each of them in particular, and first of the moral activity. The moral activity is practical. It is concerned with action and with those states of mind which lead to action. A state of mind is judged and tested morally according to the action which is likely to result from it. It is, in fact, judged as part of the process of action and seen as one with that process. The moral activity consists in doing what is right for its own sake; and thought, so far as it is subject to the moral activity, is part of doing.

There is a desire of the spirit to do what is

right, and all processes of the mind may be controlled by that desire. But the final satisfaction of that desire is in action, not in thought; and, however right thought may be, it cannot be satisfied morally except in action. The spirit is profoundly dissatisfied, filled with a sense of impotence, if right thinking is accompanied by wrong action. For in that case the thinking is baulked of its proper results in action. There is a process begun rightly but finished wrongly, or rather not finished at all, for the wrong action is not a part of the process, but a contradiction of it.

Now in other philosophies many different reasons are given why men should do what is right, and there is much questioning as to how men can know what is right. Sometimes, indeed, right is discovered to be not right at all, but something else, such as enlightened self-interest, or the interest of the whole human race. And these philosophies are always in difficulties to explain why, if right is not really right but something else, men should feel that peculiar emotion which

they do feel about right; why they should so passionately value it as right and not as something else. There is, of course, the same difficulty about men's value for truth and for beauty. There is the fact that men do value each of these for its own sake, and do feel a peculiar emotion about each which is the expression of that value, an emotion they do not feel about anything which they do not value for its own sake.

But if we accept the philosophy of the spirit, we make no attempt to explain away these emotions and these values in terms of anything else. We say simply that the spirit values what is right, what is true, and what is beautiful for their own sake. The spirit has, as it were, an appetite for these, as the body has an appetite for food. And just as the spirit itself cannot be explained in terms of anything else, so they cannot be explained in terms of anything else. So we can only define what is right as that which the spirit desires to do for its own sake, and not for any further purpose. When the spirit desires to do something for its own sake, it desires

to do what is right; and when we allow this desire to be thwarted or contradicted in action, we do what is wrong.

It is, of course, true that we judge our actions constantly by their effects upon others. That is because right, to the spirit, is doing good, not harm, to others. The desire of the spirit is to do good to others, for the sake of doing good and not for any further reason. Therefore we have to judge our actions by their results; and we have to take thought how we can act so as to do good to others, and not harm. But this judging of our actions, and this taking thought, is all part of the moral activity, all a means to that end which is pursued for its own sake. It is only the manner in which the desire to do what is right accomplishes itself. It is, in fact, like the technique of the artist, and it cannot rightly be practised except under the control of the desire to do what is right for its own sake.

If, for instance, I go about trying to do good to others so that they may do good to me, or even so that I may enjoy the conscious-

ness of my own goodness, I am aiming really not at their well-being, but at my own. And, since I am not aiming at their well-being, I shall not accomplish their well-being. How am I to know what is best for them? I cannot know it except through the desire to do what is best for them. And if my desire is not to do that, but to do something which will in some way profit myself, I lack the one means by which I can discover what is good for them.

This is not mysticism, but common-sense. For if my ultimate aim is my own profit, I shall be thinking all the while of that profit, and not of what is best for them. I may persuade myself, for my own pleasure, that my aim is to do what is best for them; but if it is not, my action will all the while be controlled by my real aim, and I shall fail in doing what is best for them, just as an artist whose real aim is to make money fails in his art.

In doing good to other people, it is not merely the act itself that matters, but the manner in which it is done. Or, rather, the

manner in which it is done is an essential part of the action. Thus, to take a crude instance, I may give money to a man in such a manner that he will hate me for it or love me for it. If the result is that he hates me, I am not doing good to him at all, though I may pride myself on the good I have done. So the giving of the money is not the whole action; the manner in which it is given is also part of the action. But the manner depends on the spirit in which I give it. If I give it so that I may enjoy the consciousness of my own generosity, the manner will be bad, and the man will hate me rather than love me for my gift. I must give it from the desire to do good for its own sake—that is to say, to do good to him, not to myself, if he is to love me for it, if he is to profit by it in mind as well as in body.

We have in our ordinary morality, especially as we teach it to the young, fatally separated doing good from the reasons why we do it. We are not aware that we can only do good if we do it for the right reason—that is to say, for the sake of doing

it. For that right reason alone will tell us what is good. It alone will supply the right manner to an action without which the action itself ceases to be right. A great deal of the morality taught to the young insists upon the happy consequences of right doing—that is to say, upon the happy consequences to the doer. The young see through this quick enough. They see that the consequences are not necessarily happy, and their spirits are not satisfied with a morality which insists upon happy consequences. Hence they will often be naughty out of a mere rebellion against this commercial morality; and a great part of the naughtiness of boys at school is really a blind rebellion of the spirit against a commercial morality which does not satisfy it.

Boys think it fine to do wrong; they encourage each other in doing wrong, and have an etiquette of conspiracy and disobedience against their masters because there is a kind of perverse disinterestedness in their wrong-doing. At least, they are not doing it for reward, and are not consenting to the view

that action ought to be controlled by the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. The whole system of reward and punishment is distasteful to them, not because of the original sin that is in them, but because the spirit in them desires to escape from all thought of reward and punishment. And since they are not taught to do what is right for its own sake, they make their escape by doing what is wrong for its own sake. To them the model boy is disagreeable because he is a slave to the system of rewards and punishments, because he is incapable of disinterested action of any kind. And if they kick him, it is not from mere envy, but because they feel that he deserves punishment as well as reward.

All, or a great deal of, this perversity might be cured if boys could be made to understand that they should do what is right for the sake of doing it, and that goodness consists in that and in nothing else. But their natural desire for disinterestedness is seldom appealed to. They are told nothing, or else something false, about the nature of good-

ness, and often they go through the whole of their school-time without ever learning anything about it, and with a vague notion that goodness is something which their masters wish to impose upon them for their own convenience. Hence the belief, common among clever and spirited youths, that morality is all convention; which, indeed, it is, unless it is the result of the moral activity of the spirit.

As to punishment, the reasons for it should be made quite plain to children as soon as possible, both by their parents and at school. It should be explained to them that they are not punished because they are wicked or to make them good, since they must be good, and can only be good, for the sake of goodness, and not so that they may escape punishment. They are to be punished so that they may be prevented from doing things harmful to themselves or to others. Whether or not punishment is the best means of prevention is a question which the parent or teacher must settle for himself. But if he does

punish he should have the right reason for doing so and make that reason clear to the offender. Above all, he must not punish out of moral indignation, or express moral indignation to the offender if he punishes him. It is far better that he should punish out of mere anger, for a boy knows then that he is punished because he has made a nuisance of himself, and such punishment warns him what will happen to him in life if he continues to make a nuisance of himself. It is an example of the natural reaction of the world against those who make nuisances of themselves.

But, in the main, punishment should be for breaches of rules. It should be explained to the child that rules are made for the general convenience and that a breach of them is not a breach of the moral law, but an inconvenience. If there is no other way to make the child keep them, he must be punished, but he, too, should be made to see that the punishment is a *pis aller*, something irrational in its nature, and necessary only

because he is irrational. Let him by all means be made to understand that it does not pay to break rules; but this appeal to his self-interest must not be confused with an appeal to his moral sense. For he himself will be aware of the confusion, even if he cannot state it clearly to himself. He will feel that an unfair advantage is being taken of him and will resent it, probably by breaking every rule that he can break without being discovered. The spirit exists in him with its desire to do right for its own sake, and it is merely bewildered and affronted when he is told to do right for some other reason.

Thus all moral education should be based upon the assumption that the desire of the spirit exists in every child, and the education should consist of a strengthening of that desire and of an effort to make its nature clear to the child, so that he may know that he desires to do what is right, and for no reason except that it is right. He may by other means be disciplined into obedience,

but he will be obeying others and not his own spirit, and as soon as the need for obedience is gone he will have no guidance except what his spirit, confused rather than illuminated by education, can give him.

IV

THE INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY

The intellectual activity of the spirit is concerned, not with action, but with thought, and so with thought apart from action. Its aim is to discover the truth about things; and though the discovery may, and often must, affect action, yet it is made for its own sake and not with a view to action. So a state of mind is judged, intellectually, apart from any action which may result from it. When I try to discover the truth about anything, I do not ask myself what will be the effect of the truth upon my action; still less do I test the truth or falsehood of my ideas by their possible effect upon my action. It is, indeed, impossible that I should do so, for, if I try to do so, the idea ceases to be

true or false to me and becomes merely useful or harmful. The intellectual desire of the spirit is to discover what is true, and it cannot be satisfied by discovering what is useful.

This intellectual desire of the spirit exists in everyone in greater or less strength, just like the moral desire, and its absolute value needs to be recognised no less. Indeed, it will not be satisfied except with a recognition of its absolute value; and there can be no healthy and free life of the spirit where it is not recognised.

We know, of course, that the desire for truth is of great practical value; all our scientific discoveries are the result of it. But truth must be an end in itself if it is to be discovered, and if all these valuable practical results are to be obtained from its discovery. Truth will not be discovered in a society which asks what is the good of it, but only in a society which has a spiritual hunger for truth. But on this point there is often a curious confusion in men's minds. They suppose that hunger for the truth is only

spiritual if there is a moral purpose in that hunger, if a man tries to discover the truth so that he may do good to other men. But a man must try to discover that truth for which his spirit hungers, or he will discover no truth at all. If his desire is for metaphysical truth he must seek that without asking how it will profit mankind. All truth sooner or later will profit mankind; but it will be discovered only when men do not look beyond it for profit either to themselves or to others. There must be no argument about its value. It must be accepted, as a fact, that the spirit desires truth for its own sake, and that, because it is the spirit, it has a right to that desire, just as it has a right to the desire for goodness.

Where this is denied, morals suffer with the injury that is done to the intellect. A man can be good without being clever, but he cannot be good unless he desires the truth for its own sake and uses his intellect to discover it. The spirit is one, though its activities are three, and it suffers if any one of these activities is never practised. This does not

mean, of course, that a man must try to discover the truth about everything. It means that, whenever he believes anything, he must wish to believe what is true, for the sake of truth. He may, of course, accept what others tell him, but in that case he must do so because he trusts them, and not because it is easiest, or most comfortable, or safest to believe what they tell him. This trust must be a real trust in their superior knowledge and wisdom, not a slavish acceptance of some common opinion about them. The mass of men hold a great many opinions to which they have no right, because they are not the result of any search for the truth. They believe what they want to believe, and their intellect is at the mercy of their prejudices and desires. We can all see this very clearly in the case of the Germans now. They believe about our conduct and theirs just what they want to believe. They believe, for instance, that England and France, and Belgium herself, all conspired together to violate the neutrality of Belgium, although it is plain that our one interest in that neutrality was to preserve

it. They could not be so docile in their beliefs if they had not been trained to believe what is convenient rather than what is true. And it is this docility of theirs, more than any wickedness, that has caused them to commit their national crimes.

Therefore, one chief aim of education should be to insist that truth is always desirable for its own sake, and no matter what its consequences may seem to be. It should encourage the spiritual desire for truth no less than the spiritual desire for goodness. It should insist that the function of the intellect is to discover truth, not to discover reasons for doing what we want to do. And it should therefore never discourage in the learner any desire for truth, however inconvenient it may be. A boy should feel that his parent or his master has a common interest with him in discovering the truth, not that his elders are in a conspiracy to conceal it from him. There is, no doubt, sometimes danger in the truth; but there is far more danger in the notion that truth does not matter, or that men or boys can be good

without desiring it. For that notion is one against which the spirit naturally rebels; and a boy whose spirit is starved of the truth will often, in reaction, believe that nothing matters but truth, that morals are merely imposed upon him by his elders for their own convenience. Clever boys are often cynics because their desire for truth is thwarted, and because, in consequence, they value nothing but the activity of the intellect. They do not know what ails them, nor do their elders know. The parent and the teacher are often impatient of the perversities of the starved spirit; but it is their business not to starve it in any of its proper desires. It is their business to make the universe seem intelligible, not unintelligible, to the young; to explain law, not to lay down rules; for it is the natural instinct of the spirit, in its desire for truth, to rebel against rules when they are blindly imposed, and this rebellion, however much of a nuisance it may be, is necessary to the healthy life of any society. It is just because there is not enough of it in Germany at present, because

her young have been taught to believe what is supposed to be for the good of the nation, because they have not revolted against this teaching but have taken the good of the nation for an absolute good, that the Germans have committed more crimes in their docility than any nation has ever committed out of sheer lawlessness.

There is often a confusion in our minds between truth-telling, as a matter of morals, and the desire of the spirit for truth. A man may desire to tell the truth for moral reasons, and may pride himself on doing so, and yet there may be in him very little desire to know the truth. Truth-telling, when it is a matter of morals, is action; but the desire to know the truth for its own sake belongs to thought, and is independent of action, independent of our relation with each other. Telling the truth, being an expression of the moral activity, is controlled by that activity, and there are times when the moral activity will not express itself in telling the truth, when to tell it is to obey a hard-and-fast rule, and not to obey the moral conscience. But the

desire to know the truth *is* the intellectual activity of the spirit. That activity desires truth just as the moral activity desires goodness, and it cannot desire anything else. To it truth is the absolute; but truth-telling is not the absolute to the moral activity. We make a rule to tell the truth because we are on our guard against our own natural tendency to lie, as an easy way out of a difficulty; and this rule is a safeguard against our own infirmities. But for them we should need no rule at all. So truth-telling is a discipline rightly imposed upon the young that they may not fall into the bad and easy habit of lying. But they ought to know that it is a discipline; they ought not to confuse it with the intellectual activity of the spirit whose desire is to know the truth, not to tell it. And it ought to be explained to them that, without the desire to know the truth for its own sake, they cannot tell the truth to any good purpose, nor make use of it when it is told to them.

The phrase, intellectual honesty, shows us how closely the moral and intellectual

activities of the spirit are connected with each other. Indeed, the intellectual is a necessary preparation for the moral; without it the moral activity loses its sense of direction. A man does not need to be clever before he be good; but he does need to desire truth for its own sake. And the Greeks insisted upon this when they said "Know thyself"; for a man cannot know himself unless he desires truth for its own sake. To know yourself is the beginning of intellectual honesty, and without that there cannot be moral honesty either. Yet, and this is the point which many educators miss, intellectual honesty must be desired for its own sake and not so that it may lead to moral honesty; for there is no way to attain to it except by desiring it for its own sake. That is the law of the spirit, a law proved as constantly by experience as any physical law. Therefore, in education the intellect should be taught to desire truth for its own sake, and all training of the intellect should be subsidiary to this teaching. Knowledge itself is useless, or worse than useless, without the intellectual

conscience. A man can make what he will of facts if he does not use them to discover the truth, if they are to him merely useful instruments for the accomplishment of some practical purpose. That, too, is proved to us by the immense learning and the present incredible perversity of Germany. For in Germany the official view of learning is that it should be all at the service of the State and of the designs of the State.

In the past no nation has desired truth for its own sake more than the Germans; they were even laughed at for this high passion of theirs. But because they desired truth for its own sake they excelled all other nations in knowledge, and were able to perfect a wonderful machinery for the acquirement of it. Then came the perversion of this machinery. Knowledge was to be used, not to discover the truth, but to support theories favourable to the designs of the State; and in a moment the knowledge ceased to be knowledge and became learned ignorance. For knowledge is always a means to an end, and that end the truth; so that,

without the desire for the truth, it is like the technique of an art used for some purpose not artistic, such as money-making—and the result, in both cases, is nonsense.

But this fact should be constantly insisted upon in education, for, if it is not, the pupil sees no beauty or meaning in knowledge, since all its beauty and meaning come to it from that truth at which it aims. A boy who is taught knowledge without knowing the final reason why he should learn it comes to hate it. He sees no connection between the labour of learning it and that desire of the spirit for the truth which is certainly in him. Education should make him conscious of that desire and of its absolute value, and should show him the connection between that desire and what he is taught. And, further, if the teacher is always aware of that connection, he will himself have a principle, and the only right one, by which to test the value of the knowledge that he teaches, and he will teach it so as to make the connection always apparent to the pupil. We have one theory in education that learning is valuable as a

discipline because it is disagreeable; another that it is only valuable when it is pleasant. Both these theories are really hedonistic; for the first is merely a blind reaction from hedonism, and the second is a reaction from the first back into hedonism. We can escape from both and from the whole hedonistic fallacy only if we see that the proper aim of intellectual education is to satisfy the spiritual desire for truth, as the proper aim of moral education is to satisfy the spiritual desire for goodness. A boy is to learn, not because learning is pleasant or unpleasant, but so that he may know the truth and so that his desire to know the truth for its own sake may be strengthened. At every turn the appeal must be to his intellectual conscience. Unless he learns thoroughly, he can never know the truth about anything; for thorough learning is itself an expression of the desire to know the truth, and inaccuracy means an indifference to the truth. But to make this plain to the pupil the teacher must himself have the intellectual conscience. He must express his own

passion for the truth in all his teaching. That is to say, while he teaches others he must be teaching himself; with every repetition of a lesson he must be making it more clear to himself why he teaches it. That is the only way by which he can escape weariness for himself and for his pupils. He, too, must be always a learner; but the great difficulty of education is that those who wish to teach often do not care to learn; and those who wish to learn often do not care to teach. Only the man who sees that teaching is also learning can be a good teacher.

V

THE ÆSTHETIC ACTIVITY

It is far more difficult to speak of the æsthetic activity of the spirit than of the moral and intellectual, because neither its nature nor its importance is yet clearly understood. It is commonly supposed, for instance, that the æsthetic activity is only exercised in the production and experience of works of art. And so even those who believe that it must be exercised for its own sake, like the other spiritual activities, suppose that it plays a much smaller part in our lives than the other two activities.

But most people do not believe that it must be exercised for its own sake. It is to them merely a source of pleasure, and they

think that the enjoyment of this pleasure is only justified as a means to some moral or intellectual end. This, again, they believe because they suppose that the æsthetic activity is only concerned with works of art, and to them works of art are merely a source of pleasure.

But we cannot understand either works of art or the nature and value of the æsthetic activity itself, unless we grasp the fact that works of art are only the most complete and conscious expression of that activity, and that we are, all our lives, constantly exercising that activity without going so far as to produce works of art which can be experienced by others. In this respect the æsthetic activity exactly resembles the intellectual. There are men who write books in which they discover truth and communicate it to others. But the intellectual activity is not only exercised in the production of such books; we are exercising it constantly in our ordinary lives; and it is a part of our well-being to desire the truth and to discover it without communicating it by means of the

written word to others. Indeed, the desire for truth is a spiritual activity just because truth is desired for its own sake and without even the further aim of communicating it to others. The communication is not the essence of the activity. A man writes really to make the truth more clear to himself. It is his means of discovering the truth more precisely than he can discover it otherwise. And, having discovered it thus precisely, he communicates it to others because of the social instinct that is in all of us. But he must satisfy himself that it is truth before he wishes to communicate it at all.

So it is with the æsthetic activity. That we all exercise and for its own sake. The work of art is a more precise exercise of it, as writing is a more precise exercise of the intellectual activity. It means a more successful exercise, but it is not different in kind from the continual exercise of that faculty by men who produce no works of art and are not called artists.

But, having said so much, we are still

confronted with the great difficulty about the æsthetic faculty, the difficulty of defining it. The intellectual activity aims at knowing the truth. But what does the æsthetic faculty aim at? This difficulty has not yet been thoroughly overcome; we are less conscious of our exercise of the æsthetic activity than of our exercise of the moral and intellectual; and therefore we are less aware of its nature and importance.

We are aware, however, of our constant sense of what we call the beauty and ugliness of things. We say that things are beautiful or ugly, as we say that they are true or untrue, good or evil. And we say this not only of things that are beautiful or ugly to the eye. A thought, an action, may be beautiful or ugly to us, and that not merely by metaphor. We exercise an æsthetic judgment about all things, which we know to be different from our moral or our intellectual judgment. We have an æsthetic value for all things, which we know to be different from our moral and intellectual values; and it is this value which we express when we use the words beautiful

and ugly. Further, we know this value to be absolute, just like our moral and intellectual values. We do not value that which we call beautiful because it is true or because it is good, but because it is beautiful. Our sense of its beauty may be connected with our sense of its truth or goodness, but it is different. The æsthetic feeling can be clearly distinguished from the moral or the intellectual, and so the æsthetic value can be clearly distinguished also.

And the æsthetic value can be clearly distinguished from the value of utility. An object, such as a chair or a coal scuttle, may be well designed for its purpose, and I may value it because it fulfils its purpose well. It may also be beautiful, and its beauty may be closely connected with its fulfilment of its purpose. I may value it æsthetically because I see that it does express its purpose in its whole design. Yet this æsthetic value is distinct in itself from its practical value. Someone might value its utility just as much who saw no beauty in it at all. Further, we have an extreme æsthetic value for some

things, such as music, which have no utility value whatever, nor have they any moral or intellectual value. People sometimes say that music has a moral value; but they say this because they suppose that we value things æsthetically only for the pleasure they give; and when they find that they value music for something above pleasure, they conclude that they must value it morally.

But they do not value it morally, because they do not value it for its effect upon their conduct. They value it for the state of mind which it produces in them; and that they value for its own sake. The arts stir the æsthetic activity within us; and we value them because they do so and because we value the æsthetic activity, like the moral and intellectual, for its own sake.

This must be clearly understood or we shall be continually hampered in our exercise of the æsthetic activity. If we try to value a work of art, or any æsthetic experience of reality, for moral reasons, we shall miss the æsthetic experience. If we look at a sunset so that it may affect our conduct,

we shall fail to experience it æsthetically, and it will not affect our conduct. For certainly our æsthetic activities, like our intellectual, do affect our conduct. Everything which affects our minds must affect our conduct. But they are æsthetic activities because they are exercised for their own sake; and, unless we exercise them so, our minds are starved of their æsthetic activities, and our conduct suffers accordingly. There are sound moral reasons for exercising the æsthetic activity; but still it must be exercised for its own sake or it cannot be exercised at all.

The work of art stirs us to æsthetic activity because it is itself an exercise of æsthetic activity, just as philosophy stirs us to intellectual activity because it is itself an exercise of intellectual activity. But as reality stirs us to intellectual, so it stirs us to æsthetic activity; and as the intellectual activity aims at the discovery of truth in the whole mass of our experience, so the æsthetic activity aims at the apprehension of what we call beauty. Beauty seems a vaguer word to us than truth

because we cannot test our apprehension of beauty as we often can our discovery of truth, by some practical application of it. We can prove a theory to be true, we often say, because it works; that is to say, because we can apply it to some practical aim and because it helps us to succeed in that aim. We cannot so apply our apprehension of beauty; and we cannot prove that anything is beautiful because it works. So we say that we are not so certain of beauty as of truth, and we suppose that the definition of beauty is more difficult than the definition of truth. Yet the moment an attempt is made to define truth, apart from its practical results, the attempt fails just as completely as the attempt to define beauty; and so it is with the attempt to define goodness. But we are further hampered in our effort to understand beauty and the æsthetic activity, because, whereas we know that truth is something that happens to our own minds as a result of our intellectual activity, we suppose that beauty is a quality of things which we see, just as we see that things are square or pink. But

beauty, just like truth, is something that happens to our minds as a result of the exercise of the æsthetic activity. There is a glory of the universe which we call truth and which we discover or apprehend, and a glory of the universe which we call beauty and which we discover or apprehend. Both glories are revealed to us through our power of seeing things or facts in a certain relation to each other; and we see them in one relation when we exercise the intellectual activity, and in another when we exercise the æsthetic.

So, as the philosopher reveals truth to us by setting facts in a relation which he has apprehended or discovered, the artist reveals beauty to us by setting facts also in a relation which he has apprehended or discovered. But the only final test of beauty or truth for us is our recognition of them, of this relation in which the glory of the universe is revealed to us; and our delight in both is always a delight in the revealed glory of the universe. Hence we often say that a work of art is true, because we recog-

nise the glory of the universe in art as in truth; because we see that the relation to which the artist has attained is right, just as we see that the relation to which the philosopher has attained is right, when we recognise the truth of what he says.

But we must not, in talking thus of truth, confuse the æsthetic with the intellectual activities, or suppose that the æsthetic is subordinate to the intellectual. The æsthetic activity discovers its own relation, the relation of beauty, in things, which is not the intellectual relation of truth. And it discovers this relation for its own sake, for its own glory. The artist discovers it for us, whether in a representation of the real world or in an arrangement of material things, such as sounds, which represent nothing; but in both it is this glory of the universe which he discovers, this beauty which he apprehends and communicates to us in his work of art. And so we are always endeavouring to apprehend the same relation, the same glory in the universe; and our æsthetic activity is an effort to apprehend it. The only difference

between us and him, or between us and the philosopher, is that he carries his apprehension further and makes it more precise; and this he does in the work of art as the philosopher does it in writing. Writing and the work of art are both an effort at greater precision, at a more intense and concentrated and isolated intellectual or æsthetic activity. But the artist is an artist, the philosopher is a philosopher, for the same reason that we exercise our intellectual and æsthetic activities on our own account, and not because they want to gain pudding or praise.

They may make their living by the exercise of the æsthetic or intellectual activities, but that is only a fortunate accident for them. Most of us cannot make our living so; yet the spirit in us constantly desires to exercise these faculties, and is thwarted and troubled if it cannot exercise them.

So we must not be taught to believe that these faculties are only to be exercised by artists and philosophers or that we ourselves turn to their works merely for diversion, and

as we turn to games. We cannot apprehend truth and beauty in their works unless we also constantly exercise our own spiritual activities in apprehending truth and beauty in the universe. The philosopher and the artist only exist for us, their works only have any meaning for us, in so far as we ourselves exercise our intellectual and spiritual activities. We can but recognise in these works the same glory which we have already recognised in the universe, only made clearer through the apprehension of the philosopher and the artist. Otherwise art and philosophy will be to us mere games played for their skill and enjoyed for their skill. They have reality for us only when we recognise in them what we also have experienced, only when they affirm to us a glory of the same nature as that which we have discovered for ourselves.

Hence the value of art is not merely the value of works of art. It is the value of the æsthetic activity of the spirit, and we must all value that before we can value works of art rightly; and ultimately we must value

this glory of the universe, to which we give the name of beauty when we apprehend it. For it is, ultimately, a glory of what is outside us and not merely of our own mental processes. Our joy is not in the process of apprehension, but in what we apprehend. It is in discovering that which can be valued for its own sake, and in recognising that it is to be valued for its own sake, that it is good in itself.

All the richness and health of our lives depend upon this discovery, this recognition. We live in our relation to the universe, and not merely in our effort to go on living. And this relation of ours is threefold, and must be threefold if it is to be right and sane. It is a moral relation—that is to say, a relation of action—an intellectual relation, a relation in which we discover truth, and an æsthetic relation, in which we discover beauty. But the moral relation, the most active of the three, cannot be right unless it is prepared for by the other two, more passive, relations. We do, as it were, in our moral activity give out energy which

we have taken in through our other spiritual activities, just as, physically, we give out energy which we have taken in food and drink. In both cases the energy is transformed. But the fact remains that our intellectual and æsthetic activities must be pursued for their own sake, and not for their moral results; for otherwise they will not be intellectual and æsthetic. They justify themselves, and do not need a moral justification, yet they have a moral justification, just as the moral activity has an æsthetic and an intellectual justification. The three activities are on perfectly equal terms, and we cannot understand them or ourselves unless we recognise their equality

So in education the absolute value of the æsthetic activity should be recognised, and that not merely in relation to works of art, but also in relation to the universe. A boy should be made to understand that when he perceives the beauty of anything, he is exercising an activity of the spirit, whether it be the beauty of nature or the beauty of art. He should be taught that to see beauty

is not merely to amuse yourself, but to be aware of a glory of the universe, and that it is an end of life to be aware of this glory.

Our education has failed æsthetically, perhaps, more than in any other respect because we are less aware of the absolute value of the æsthetic activity than of the absolute value of the other two activities of the spirit. It is not commonly believed that the æsthetic activity is an activity of the spirit at all. Rather it is supposed to be an amusement too effeminate and enervating for manly English boys. The ordinary teacher has been taught to undervalue it in himself, and he is therefore inclined to suppress it in his pupils. Yet the fact remains that it is an activity of the spirit, and that the spirit is thwarted and troubled if it cannot exercise all its activities. Hence our whole civilisation suffers both morally and intellectually from the suppression of the æsthetic activity. We have philistinism on the one hand, which is a stubborn denial of the value of that activity, and æstheticism on the other,

which is a morbid exercise of it and a perverse insistence upon its exclusive value. Æstheticism is a reaction against philistinism, a reaction which is bound to occur whenever the æsthetic activity is denied. There are boys in whom the æsthetic activity is too strong to be suppressed, and they commonly revolt against the exclusive insistence upon the moral activity. Often they think that there is something romantic and delightful in immorality, not because they are wicked, but because they see in morality as it is taught them a mere hindrance to the exercise of that other activity which their spirit desires. Morality, when it ousts the other activities of the spirit, does seem to them immoral, as indeed it is. It starves them, and they fly to the conclusion that the only way to richness and freedom is to deny the absolute value of the moral activity altogether. There they fall into the same error as their teachers, who deny the absolute value of the æsthetic activity; and their counter-denial is itself a

fierce and perverse morality, an attempt to redress the balance. The doctrine of art for art's sake in its last absurdity, when it asserts that man should live for art and for nothing else, is a moral doctrine and a declaration that ordinary morality is immoral. It is a kind of æsthetic puritanism, asserting that man is purely an æsthetic creature, as the puritan asserts that he is purely a moral creature. Both are wrong, and wrong because they are both in blind reaction against some other error. It is the function of education to preserve the pupil from all such reactions by teaching him the absolute value of all his spiritual activities, by making him understand that the aim of his life is to exercise them all, and to be aware of the glory of the universe in all three of its manifestations. Unless we exercise our æsthetic activity, the universe is not glorious to us. Science is a discovery of arid facts, and duty obedience to a set of rules. When Christ told His disciples to consider the lilies of the field, He assumed that they

had seen their beauty, that they had exercised their æsthetic activity upon them. If they had not done so, His statement that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these would have been meaningless. Solomon's array must have been finer than theirs, because more costly, to anyone who did not see the greater beauty of the lilies, and who was not aware that this beauty was to be valued absolutely and not because of its significance in terms of something else.

Love beauty for its own sake, and you will love it better than luxury, which you only value because it gives you comfort or heightens your importance. And this saying of Christ's is an assertion of the absolute value of beauty and the merely relative value of luxury. Christ's whole teaching, and the teaching of all true religion, is an assertion of absolute values. He tells us which are the things outside us that we are to value absolutely, and not in terms of something else, and among them is beauty. A man is living well when he forgets himself and all

the demands of his own flesh in doing what is right for the love of what is right, and in seeking truth for the love of truth; but he is also living well when he forgets himself in seeking beauty for the love of beauty. This forgetfulness of self, of all the demands of the flesh, is what we live for; but we can only attain to it through the activities of the spirit, which put us into a right relation with the universe outside us.

We are apt to think of love as if it were a merely moral feeling; but love is the realisation of the absolute value of things outside us, which is attained to intellectually and æsthetically no less than morally. While we value things outside us in terms of our own well-being, we cannot love at all. For self-love is only a metaphor. Love is good, but self-love is bad; therefore it is not love. What we call self-love is merely a failure to love, a failure to see absolute value in what is outside ourselves. But when I love beauty or truth, I escape from self-love no less than when I love goodness. The human animal

desires to escape from its animal prison by means of all kinds of love, by freedom of emotion no less than of action or thought. And it attains to the freedom of emotion when it is aware of beauty. It cannot be aware of beauty except in self-forgetfulness, and it cannot produce beauty except in self-forgetfulness. There is in every human being the passionate desire for this self-forgetfulness, and a passionate delight in it when it comes. The child feels that delight among spring flowers; we can all remember how we felt it in the first apprehension of some new beauty of the universe, when we ceased to be little animals and became aware that there was this beauty outside us to be loved. And most of us must remember, too, the strange indifference of our elders. They were not considering the lilies of the field; they did not want us to get our feet wet among them. We might be forgetting ourselves, but they were remembering us; and we became suddenly aware of the bitterness of life and the tyranny of facts. Now parents

and nurses and teachers have, of course, to remember children when they forget themselves. But they ought to be aware that the child, when he forgets himself in the beauty of the world, is passing through a sacred experience which will enrich and glorify the whole of his life. Children, because they are not engaged in the struggle for life, are more capable of this æsthetic self-forgetfulness than they will afterwards be; and they need all of it that they can get, so that they may remember it and prize it in later years. In those heaven-sent moments they know what disinterestedness is. They have a test by which they can value all future experience and know the dullness and staleness of worldly success. Therefore it is a sin to check, more than need be, their æsthetic delight. Rather we should make them understand that this delight is to be valued for its own sake; and our schools should not be places in which they learn to be ashamed of it. The child naturally loves flowers; but the schoolboy thinks that it is childish

to love them. He gives up for things of this world, of the school-world which is none the less worldly because it is quite artificial, all those joys of the spirit which made childhood wonderful to him; and his masters often encourage him to do this. They do not like the boy who has his secrets, even though they be secrets of the spirit. They want him "to play his part in the life of the place," which is a worldly life of rewards and punishments. He must do what pays; and while he does that, whether in work or in games, he is losing his sense of absolute values, that sense which it should be the chief aim of education to strengthen. Nearly every boy leaves school weaker in his æsthetic activity than when he went there, and so impoverished rather than enriched by his education. The delicacy of childhood is lost in the school-worldliness; the first lesson the boy learns there is to care for nothing for its own sake. He must care for what other boys like, and he must do that so that he may get on well with other boys,

all of whom are also engaged in caring for what other boys like, and in losing their own sense of absolute values.

This certainly is not all the fault of the masters; it is chiefly the fault of parents who send their children to school so that they may become boys of the world, not so that they may be educated. But the stand against this perverse ambition of parents must be made by schoolmasters. It is peculiarly their duty to understand the philosophy of the spirit and to imply it in all the lessons that they teach. There seems to come naturally a worldly and prosaic period in the life of the boy, a period in which he despises all his former childishness, and cares for nothing but getting on with other boys. In this period his æsthetic activity is often fatally checked. He dismisses the beauty of the universe as no concern of his; and often it never again becomes his concern. It ought to be one of the main objects of education to prevent this disaster; but our present education rather encourages it,

because we do not understand the importance of the æsthetic activity, because we suppose it to be merely a source of pleasure, whereas it is an activity of the spirit without which the spirit can never be satisfied.

CONCLUSION

THERE is one very strong practical reason why children are not taught the philosophy of the spirit, and why that philosophy is not agreeable to teachers. The philosophy of the spirit implies the freedom of the spirit; and we are all afraid of freedom in others, if not in ourselves; especially are we afraid of it in the young. Thus, if we try to teach the young what is true, we naturally incline to tell them what is true, and to be angry if they doubt our knowledge of the truth. And this is not merely through self-love, but also because the young must accept what they are taught or they will learn nothing. But the philosophy of the spirit insists that there is in everyone a desire for the truth which is to be encouraged in everyone; and

this desire for the truth is something very different from a readiness to believe what is taught. So, too, the desire to do what is right is something different from the readiness to obey. If I love truth for its own sake, or righteousness for its own sake, I shall prefer both to obedience; and I may be very inconvenient to a teacher whose aim is to make me obedient. I may also be inconvenient to myself, especially when I am young and inexperienced and have little sense of the relative importance of things. The boy Shelley had a passion for truth and for righteousness, and he was a trouble to himself and to others, especially to his father and his first wife. He was unable to distinguish his passion for truth and righteousness from other passions less spiritual; and it is this inability, very common in youth, which makes their elders deny them freedom.

We all have other passions besides our spiritual passions; and it is a problem for all of us not to be mastered by these other passions. It is also a problem for our teachers. They and our parents have the

fear that we may "go to the bad"; and this fear, more than anything else, makes education difficult and the philosophy of the spirit unwelcome to teachers.

Yet the philosophy of the spirit is true; and we cannot make education easier by ignoring its truth; we cannot teach well through fear, whether our own fear or the fear of the pupil. The best way to prevent a boy from going to the bad is to teach him to go to the good; and he can only be taught to go to the good by those who know what the good is. Obedience, in itself, is not good or bad; the young must learn it only because they have to learn, and you cannot learn without obedience. But they should be made to understand that obedience is only a means to an end, and that end the freedom of the spirit to exercise its own proper activities. A boy cannot be taught what is good or true or beautiful. He can only be trained so that he may find out for himself what is good or true or beautiful, and so that his desires of the flesh may not overcome his desires of the spirit.

The commonest error in education, perhaps, is the belief that a child is mere passive material which, by means of obedience, can be made what the educator would make of it. That is not so. The child has certain desires of the flesh and certain desires of the spirit. Education cannot change these even by means of the most complete obedience. The most it can do is to establish a right relation between the desires of the flesh and the desires of the spirit, so that the desires of the spirit shall have freedom. And when they have freedom, the pupil will be free of the teacher also. Therefore the teacher should have no "will to power" over the pupil. That will to power is merely the hen's anxiety when she sees her ducklings take to the water, if it is not a worse egotism. If you teach a child to pursue his spiritual activities, you must teach him to pursue his own spiritual activities, not yours; to seek for what he sees as goodness, truth, and beauty, not for what you see. But you can do this only if you have faith in the spirit that is in everyone.

It must be a dogma with you that there is this spirit in everyone, and a desire for goodness, truth, and beauty, which are to be found only through that desire. Without that dogma, you will merely try to impose upon your pupil the results of your own experience; your effort will be to enslave him to the past, not to give him the freedom of the future.

Freedom is certainly dangerous; but so is obedience, as the Germans are now proving. Nothing is so dangerous to the mind of man as a false absolute, and the false absolute of the Germans is Germany. But you cannot guard against a false absolute, whether it be your country, or money, or any kind of worldly success, or any pleasures of the flesh, except by knowing what are the true absolutes, what are those things which a man ought to desire for their own sake, which, indeed, his spirit does actually desire. And, if you know this, you must wish that everyone should have freedom of the spirit.

At bottom our fear of freedom for the

young is a fear of the sexual instinct and all its dangers. We teach our children obedience above all things so that, when they first approach the age of puberty, they may obey us and not their sexual instinct. We do not want them to think for themselves, because we know that the sexual instinct, in its first blind power, may colour all their thoughts. It is all very well to talk of freedom of the spirit; but when a boy first reaches the age of puberty his spirit is not free, just as the spirit of a hungry man is not free; and he cannot, like the hungry man, have that satisfaction which would set his spirit free. The sexual instinct produces a strange confusion and mixture of the desires of the spirit and the desires of the flesh. In love they become one, and that is both the glory and the danger of love.

But there is a long period in the life of the child, before he reaches the age of puberty, in which the desires of the spirit may be encouraged; and if they are so encouraged, they will be his best safeguard

against the dangers of the sexual instinct. Often the sexual instinct has a vast power over a boy's mind because it means mystery and romance in a thoroughly prosaic world; and the world has become prosaic to him because all the desires of his spirit have been suppressed. He has learnt to care for games and the approval of other boys more than for truth or beauty, or even goodness. He has learnt to take everything at second-hand, even his notions of pleasure. He has lost all sense of reality, whether spiritual or material; and here is something entrancingly real which comes to him, something in which he is intensely his own individual self and not merely one of a crowd. And it is all the more real to him because it is a guilty secret, and one about which he can talk guiltily and with a new intimacy to other boys.

But if his life before had not become unreal and second-hand, this new reality would not be so enthralling to him. It is not mere wickedness that causes boys to take what we call a prurient interest in their sexual instinct.

It is the reality of the sexual instinct that absorbs them; and they will be absorbed in it unless they have already been made aware of spiritual realities. They will surrender themselves to the animal objects of life rather than be objectless, if they have no notion already of the spiritual objects of life. To those whose sense of beauty is starved sensuality comes as a great glory, because it awakens their sense of beauty. There is to them something actually good in it because it opens their eyes to what they had not seen before; and no preaching will make them believe that it is bad. But if they have been long aware of beauty and of its absolute value, they will not yield to sensuality as a revelation. If life is real to them already through the desires of the spirit, they will not be overcome by the force of this new physical reality. There is the romance of childhood, when the child becomes aware of the desires of the spirit; and the romance of youth, when the youth becomes aware of the desires of the flesh. Between these two romances there is often a dull, worldly time in which

the romance of childhood is dead, suppressed by education. But the object of education should be to prolong and encourage the romance of childhood so that youth may not be utterly bewildered and overcome by its own romance.

In our present materialistic society youth often is utterly overcome by its own romance, even when it remains perfectly respectable; and that because there is supposed to be no romance in life except this one sexual romance of youth. Our arts are absorbed in that as if there were nothing else in the universe that was not mere routine; and the one freedom that we glorify is the freedom of a man to choose the woman that he loves. There is no romance to us in the freedom of the spirit, the freedom to pursue goodness or truth or beauty for their own sake. Our notion is that when a youth has exercised his freedom of sexual selection he must settle down to business. He has had his fling, his moment of glory, his taste of disinterested passion; and after that he must do nothing for its own sake and everything for the sake

of earning a living, and as plenteous a living as possible.

But the romance of life is not exhausted by marriage for love. Love itself is only made romantic by that spiritual element in it which should persist and be strengthened through all the activities of a man's life; and if a man only becomes aware of the spirit in sexual love, that is the fault of his education. He should have been aware of it long before he knew anything about sexual love except by hearsay. He should have been trained to be a lover all his life, of all the glory of the universe and not merely of that glory as it reveals itself to him in one female human being. There is a sense of the glory of the universe, a disinterested passion, in love which distinguishes it from lust. But do we only exist to propagate our species, and is love only lust made more alluring so that the earth may never be dispeopled? There are people who believe that, because the spiritual element in life is known to them only in love; because in this time of delightful madness, as it seems to them, they are

aware of the spirit for the first and last time. But if, by education and the whole purpose and effort of society, they had been made aware of the spirit and its desires from early youth, love would be to them, not the one romance of their lives, but only one example of the continuing romance of life, the threefold romance of goodness, truth, and beauty. They would not exhaust themselves once for all in this single paroxysm of disinterestedness; nor would they in later years look back upon "being in love" as an episode of divine foolishness to be envied and yet smiled at when it is repeated in their children.

Education ought to teach us how to be in love always and what to be in love with. The great things of history have been done by the great lovers, by the saints and men of science and artists; and the problem of civilisation is to give every man a chance of being a saint, a man of science, or an artist. But this problem cannot be attempted, much less solved, unless men desire to be saints, men of science, and artists. And if they are to desire that continuously and consciously,

they must be taught what it means to be these things. We think of the man of science or the artist, if not of the saint, as a being with peculiar gifts, not as one who exercises, more precisely and incessantly perhaps, activities which we all ought to exercise. It is a commonplace now that art has ebbed away out of our ordinary life, out of all the things which we use; and that it is practised no longer by workmen, but only by a few painters and sculptors. That has happened because we no longer recognise the æsthetic activity as an activity of the spirit and common to all men. We do not know that when a man makes anything he ought to make it beautiful for the sake of doing so, and that when a man buys anything he ought to demand beauty in it, for the sake of that beauty. We think of beauty, if we think of it at all, as a mere source of pleasure; and therefore it means to us ornament added to things, for which we can pay extra if we choose. But beauty is not an ornament to life or to the things made by man. It is an essential part of both. The æsthetic activity,

when it reveals itself in things made by men, reveals itself in design, just as it reveals itself in the design of all natural things. It shapes objects as the moral activity shapes actions; and we ought to recognise it in objects and value it, as we recognise and value the moral activity in actions. And as actions empty of the moral activity are distasteful to us, so should objects be that are empty of the æsthetic activity. But this is not so with most of us. As we do not value the æsthetic activity in ourselves, so we do not value it, do not even recognise it or the lack of it, in the work of others.

The artist, of whatever kind, is a man so much aware of the beauty of the universe that he must impart the same beauty to whatever he makes. He has exercised his æsthetic activity in the discovery of beauty in the universe before he exercises it in imparting beauty to that which he makes. He has seen things in that relation which is beauty before he can himself produce that relation in his own work, whatever it may be. And just as he sees that relation for its own sake, so he

produces it for its own sake and satisfies the desire of his spirit in doing so. And we should value his work, we should desire that relation in all things made by man, if we, too, had the habit of seeing that relation in the universe, and if we knew that, when we see it, we are exercising an activity of the spirit and satisfying a spiritual desire. And we should know, also, that work without beauty means unsatisfied spiritual desire in the worker; that it is waste of life and a common evil and danger, like thought without truth or action without righteousness.

Once understand the philosophy of the spirit, and you will see that we are all concerned with each other's spiritual activities. The aim of civilisation is not to give a few the leisure to exercise their intellectual and æsthetic activities, while the many are drudges, even if their drudgery saves them from actual want. We know that is true of the moral activity; we do not suppose that only the rich ought to be good. But it is true also of the other spiritual activities. And for this reason: that men exist so that

they may exercise all their spiritual activities and not merely so that they may be good. All men are equal in that they have an equal right to spiritual activities; and the proper aim of society is to secure this equality, not merely to secure property to those who have it.

This we need to be taught, since most of us certainly have never put it clearly to themselves. And if the young were taught it, they would see that every drudge is not merely a queer, stupid creature with manners and tastes utterly different from their own, but a human being prevented by the struggle for life from exercising those spiritual activities that are the proper business of life. And if we had learnt to exercise our own spiritual activities and to value the exercise of them above all things, the drudgery of others would become intolerable to us. The chief moral problem for all of us would be to lessen that drudgery.

Mr. Owen Wister, in his *Pentecost of Calamity*, tells us how he was in Germany a few months before the war, and how much

he was impressed by the orderly energy, the contentment, and the public spirit of the people. It seemed to him that, if he could have his choice, he would rather be a German than a Frenchman, an Englishman, or an American. And yet the Germans were then on the eve of their great crime. How was it possible for them to practise such high virtues and yet to pervert them all in a moment? It was possible because they had a wrong philosophy. The motive for all their energy and public spirit was not that they might all exercise their spiritual activities, but that Germany might be supreme among the nations. Their very spiritual activities, while they seemed to be exercised, were perverted to this end. There was in their minds a fatal confusion of spirit and flesh, like that which produces the crimes of sexual infatuation. This confusion of spirit and flesh, by which a material end seems to be spiritual and usurps the absolute value of a spiritual end, is the cause of all the worst crimes of humanity because it perverts the very conscience; and there is no safeguard against

it except the philosophy of the spirit. If the Germans had been taught what are the true absolutes, they would never have made a false absolute of Germany.

But we need the philosophy of the spirit no less, although we have not fallen into their confusion of spirit and flesh or into their fatal infatuation. They have made a State that is a danger to the world, because the aim of that State is wrong; but our State is aimless. They have used all the virtues for a material end, and have not seen that it was material; but we have left our virtues to chance. If they have a false absolute in their country, we have none at all, either true or false. There are people, not only Germans, who believe that German Kultur might save the world, and who hope therefore for a German victory. To them German Kultur is something positive, something in which men forget themselves for the State, and in doing so are raised above their natural powers; and they believe that the Germans could teach us all this secret of self-forgetfulness so that we should all do our work with

German system and thoroughness. But in us they find nothing positive at all; and we seem to them to be fighting merely for the hand-to-mouth methods of the past, and with those methods.

They are wrong, no doubt; we are at least fighting against a national egotism that the world would never endure, however much tidiness it might impose upon the world; for with that tidiness it would impose slavery. But we need to make it clear to ourselves that we are fighting for a higher and more complete self-forgetfulness than the German. The Germans value Germany above all things; but what are we taught to value above all things? Our whole society suffers from a lack of values, from a bewildered worldliness that is not even content with itself. There is hope in that discontent and bewilderment, more hope than in the determined perversity of Germany; but neither discontent nor bewilderment is good in itself; and they will lead nowhere unless we can find values, and the right values. The German defiance to the whole philosophy of the spirit has

awakened in us a sense, at least, of the moral absolute; and for that moral absolute we are fighting, for that rich and poor are forgetting themselves and giving their lives. So we may hope that our sense of the other spiritual absolutes will be quickened; and in that hope I have written this little book.

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